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Abstract
South Africa, as an upper middle-income, resource-intensive developing country with an open 
economy, has to find innovative ways to combat poverty, promote economic growth and reduce 
the intensity of resource use, simultaneously. One option is to explore the plausibility of achieving 
a double dividend by levying a tax on water and energy and recycling the revenue back to the 
economy by allowing for a reduction in other forms of taxation. According to the double dividend 
theory it is possible, under some conditions, to achieve both environmental and economic 
objectives. We investigated such a possibility in the South African economy using an integrated 
economy/environment CGE model and found that it is indeed possible to achieve such double 
dividend benefits. Given the prevailing economic and environmental contexts, government should 
actively search for ways to achieve such dividends. 
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1 
Introduction
South Africa, as an upper middle-income, 
resource-intensive developing country with 
an open economy, has to find innovative ways 
to combat poverty, promote economic growth 
and reduce the intensity of resource use 
simultaneously. The double dividend theory 
has been a popular research theme for at least 
15 years, following papers by Pearce (1991) 
and Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994)1. The 
main reason for this popularity is its seeming 
promise of a free ride: environmental taxes 
could diminish pollution at no costs or even 
lead to additional benefits, if the revenues of 
the tax are used to reduce other distortionary 
taxes, for instance on labour or capital. These 
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additional benefits – the second dividend – are 
usually an increase in welfare or GDP, or a 
decrease in unemployment2. In this study, our 
focus is on GDP and poverty. In South Africa 
the latter is not linked to employment in general, 
but to employment of the poor and prices 
of commodities bought by poor households 
specifically. We carry out an empirical analysis 
using a CGE model to calculate the potential for 
a triple dividend – an environmental, economic 
(GDP) and poverty dividend. 
The question that is posed in this paper is 
whether there is empirical support for the 
possibility of double (or even triple) dividends 
concerning specific environmental tax reform 
initiatives relating to the energy and water 
sectors. To give effect to this question, the next 
section provides a brief synopsis of the South 
African economy, followed by a discussion of the 
literature concerning double dividends. This is 
followed by a description of the model used to 
test for such a dividend in South Africa, the data 
and empirical results. The paper is concluded by 
two policy recommendations.
2 
Background
Since South Africa’s first democratic elections 
in 1994 the GDP/capita has been growing 
positively for the first time since the early 1980s. 
Unfortunately the growth in GDP/capita has not 
led to an improvement in income distribution. In 
1998 the Gini-coefficient was 0.56, it deteriorated 
to 0.59 in 2004, with an unemployment rate of 
between 25 and 40 per cent (Statistics South 
Africa, 2004). Consequently, a large percentage 
of the population (between 45 and 55 per cent) 
lives in poverty (Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive Social System for South Africa, 
2002). 
Additionally, South Africa has a resource 
extraction economy that is heavily dependent 
on mining, agriculture and manufacturing, even 
though the combined contribution of the former 
two sectors to GDP is less than 10 (South African 
Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin). These sectors 
are the major employers and they generate much 
economic activity, through electricity generation 
and fuel production from coal. Therefore, 
although being a developing country, South 
Africa’s electricity consumption (93 per cent 
of which is coal based) is 3.8 megawatt hours 
(MWh) per capita compared to 1.3 MWh for 
other lower-middle-income countries and 2.5 
MWh for upper-middle-income countries. The 
country’s carbon-dioxide emissions lie between 
that of upper-middle-income and high-income 
countries at 7.4 (metric) tonnes (t) carbon 
dioxide (CO2) per capita.
South Africa had 44 million people in 1998 
and a total water inflow of 65.3 million m3, 
therefore the number of people per flow unit is 
1 481, or 982 m3 per capita per annum (World 
Bank, 2005). Not only does South Africa have 
a disproportionately high carbon footprint, the 
country has a chronic water scarcity as well, as 
indicated in Table 1. To address this water scarcity 
problem in the past, South Africa resorted to 
the development of new water sources. This 
option is no longer feasible and government 
has embarked on a programme to reduce water 
consumption using other mechanisms, such as 
water pricing (DWAF, 1998 and 2002). 
Table 1 
Categories of water scarcity associated with varying levels of water supply per person per year, the 
typical scales of problems encountered in each category in Africa
Water scarcity category and 
associated problems
Original index: number of people 
per flow unit  
(million m3)
Modified index: volume of water 
available per person  
(m3 person year)
Beyond the “water barrier”: 
continual, wide-scale water supply 
problems, becoming catastrophic 
during droughts.
> 2000 < 500
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Chronic water scarcity: continual 
water supply problems, worse 
during annual dry seasons, frequent 
severe droughts (South Africa falls 
in this category)
1000 –2000 500 – 1000
Water stressed: frequent seasonal 
water supply and quality problems, 
accentuated by occasional droughts.
600 – 1000 1000 – 1666
Moderate problems: occasional 
water supply and quality problems, 
with some adverse effects during 
severe droughts. 
100 – 600 1666 – 10 000
Well-watered: very infrequent 
water supply and quality problems, 
except during extreme drought 
conditions. 
< 100 > 10 000
Source: Ashton (2002)
South Africa’s economy is currently growing 
strongly, but the growth in the commercial 
sector is not directly benefiting the unemployed 
and the poor through more commercial 
opportunities for them. Moreover, this growth 
depends significantly on the resources (water 
and energy) sectors. The country is seeking 
innovative ways to grow; ways that will benefit 
the poor and reduce the impact of such growth 
on the environment. In the following section 
we explore international literature concerning 
double dividend, in anticipation of finding 
such dividend in South Africa pertaining to the 
energy and water sectors.
3 
Double dividend
The paper by Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994) 
is a good example of earlier papers in which 
relatively simple CGE models are used to prove 
that double dividends are unlikely to materialise. 
These earlier papers only incorporate one factor 
of production, namely labour. An environmental 
tax is then really just an implicit tax on labour 
and leads to a decrease in labour supply. The 
recycling of revenues through lower labour 
taxes only partly compensates for the lower 
labour supply. The reason for this is as follows: 
The environmental tax not only distorts the 
labour market, but also the commodity market: 
it reduces the demand for the dirty good3. This 
is, of course, the intention of the environmental 
tax reform. However, Bovenberg and De Mooij 
assume that initially the tax on the dirty good is 
at its Pigouvian level, and in that case, an extra 
distortion of the distribution of consumption 
over the two goods must decrease total welfare. 
These results are corroborated in other papers, 
which similarly use only one factor of production 
(Fullerton & Metcalf, 1997; Goulder et al., 
1997). 
In later papers, the introduction of more 
than one production factor (capital) enhances 
the scope for a double dividend because it 
allows the possibility of inefficiencies in the tax 
system4. These inefficiencies occur when the 
marginal efficiency costs of taxation are not 
the same for all production factors, i.e. one of 
the factors is over-taxed relative to the other5. 
By shifting the tax burden from the over-taxed 
to the under-taxed factor, efficiency can be 
increased and the total costs of taxation reduced. 
A double dividend becomes possible when an 
environmental tax reform induces such a shift. 
Conditions for this route to a double dividend 
are: (i) the difference in marginal efficiency cost 
is large, (ii) the burden of the environmental 
tax falls primarily on the under-taxed factor, 
and (iii) the revenues from the tax are used 
to reduce the tax rate on the over-taxed factor 
(Goulder, 1994). 
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Results from papers using more than one 
factor of production are mixed. Goulder (1995) 
and Bovenberg and Goulder (1997) study the 
results of a revenue neutral environmental 
tax reform for the United States with an inter-
temporal CGE analysis and find no double 
dividend. On the other hand, Jorgenson and 
Wilcoxen (1993), who also use a model for the 
US, find a double dividend when they lower 
capital taxes with the revenues of a carbon 
tax, but it does not materialise if labour taxes 
are cut instead. This agrees with the general 
notion that the marginal efficiency costs of 
capital taxation in the US are higher than 
those of labour. The occurrence of a double 
dividend in this analysis may also be explained 
by the assumed full mobility of capital in the 
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen model, while Goulder 
and Bovenberg and Goulder assume that capital 
is immobile between different sectors. The 
elasticity in capital demand is thus substantially 
larger in the Jorgenson and Wilcoxen model, 
which increases the marginal costs of taxation of 
capital. Bye (2000) also finds a double dividend 
in a CGE model of the Norwegian economy. 
Norway is a small open economy characterised 
by a particularly high marginal excess burden 
of labour taxation. The double dividend occurs 
when the revenues from a carbon tax are used 
to lower payroll taxes.
Overall, the literature concludes that the 
correct tax reform would reduce environmental 
emissions while stimulating economic growth 
and employment. This would be the case if 
the environmental tax reform reduces the 
overall level of distortion of the economy, and 
this depends on the state of the economy, the 
pre-existing tax system, and the details of the 
reform. That is, environmental tax reforms need 
to be smart to yield a double dividend. This is 
already true in the simplified representation of 
the economy and tax system used in models. In 
reality, environmental tax reform should be very 
clever indeed.
Based on these previous studies, we can 
say that the attainment of a double dividend 
in South Africa will depend mainly on the 
current inefficiencies in the tax system, and 
how these are influenced by the environmental 
tax reform. Concerning the elasticity of capital 
and labour supply, saving rates in South Africa 
are low, and capital formation depends to a 
large extent on foreign capital inflow. The 
capital supply is therefore dependent on trust 
in present and future institutional quality, 
absence of corruption, secure property rights 
and low inflation. In that context, a marginal 
change in the rate of return on capital may 
be less important. As for labour, a distinction 
must be made between skilled and unskilled 
labour. Most skilled labour is employed, while 
unemployment rates for unskilled labourers 
are very high. In abstract terms, we can assume 
that unskilled labour is in infinite supply, and 
that the effect of tax shifting on the unskilled 
labour market will be of major importance 
for its overall effect on output and income. 
Therefore, a double dividend is most likely to 
occur if the environmental taxes fall mostly 
on capital and skilled labour, and the tax 
revenues can be used to increase the demand 
for unskilled labour.
4 
Philosophy of double dividends with 
energy and water
The typical second target variable studied in 
the double dividend literature is real GDP. The 
decrease in GDP that results from an increase 
of R1,00 in total tax revenue is referred to as 
the marginal excess burden (MEB) of a tax, 
that is:
MEB = decrease in real GDP/increase in real 
 government income6
Conversely, when a tax is reduced, as under 
the recycling schemes, the MEB measures 
the increase in GDP per decrease in total 
tax revenues. The MEB is a measure of the 
distortionality of a tax. As both the numerator 
and the denominator have the same unit of 
measurement (rand), the MEB measure is 
without dimension. By comparing MEBs of 
different scenarios, we find combinations of 
scenarios that produce a second dividend, i.e. 
an increase in GDP, while maintaining total 
government revenues constant.
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The third dividend in this study is poverty 
reduction. We define the marginal poverty 
burden (MPB) as: 
MPB = decrease in real income of the poorest 
 households/increase in real govern- 
 ment income 
As GDP is our income measure, MPB has the 
same properties as MEB. Indeed, MEB is the 
weighted average of the MEB per income class, 
while the MPB is the same, but then with zero 
weights for the higher incomes.
Could appropriate ways of recycling revenue 
from energy and/or water-related environmental 
taxes result in double or triple dividends? We 
implement a CGE model to calculate and 
compare the marginal excess burdens of energy- 
and water-related environmental taxes with the 
MEBs of recycling the revenue, in order to find 
possible double or even triple dividends. 
4.1 Tax instruments for carbon  
 reduction
Four policy simulations are run to analyse the 
effects of various environmental tax instruments 
related to CO2 reduction, namely (i) a carbon 
tax, (ii) a fuel tax, (iii) an electricity tax and (iv) 
an energy tax.
The carbon tax implies a levy of R35 per tonne 
CO2
7, which is approximately equivalent to 5 
USD/tonne CO2
8, based on the conservative 
estimate of Sandor (2001)9. Such a tax would 
capture all emissions from burning fossil fuel 
at the point of combustion and is applied to the 
CO2-emission by sector. From an environmental 
perspective, this tax would be the best alternative 
since it is directly linked to the environmental 
objective of a reduction in CO2-emissions (Van 
Heerden et al., 2006). (Note that emissions from 
burning biomass - mostly firewood gathered by 
households - are not taxed.)
The fuel tax is relatively easy to implement, 
since it excludes coal used in electricity and 
gasoline production. It amounts to a tax of 4,330 
R/TJ, 2.337 R/TJ, and 2.454 R/TJ on the final 
consumption of coal, crude oil and gas, and 
gasoline. The tax is calculated as the carbon 
tax (35 R/tonne CO2) multiplied by the average 
carbon content per energy unit of the fuels 
(124. 67, and 70 tonne CO2/TJ, respectively). 
The industrial use of coal, crude oil and gas, 
and petroleum products is taxed, as well as the 
household consumption of petroleum products 
(Van Heerden et al., 2006). 
In scenario three a tax is levied on all 
intermediate and household consumption of 
electricity. The tax per MWh is again based on 
a carbon tax of 35 R/tonne CO2, using conversion 
factors from Blignaut and Zunckel (2004: 298-
303). In SI units, the tax level is equivalent 
to an electricity tax of 10.651 R/TJ, using the 
conversion of 1MWh = 0.0036TJ. The gap 
between the electricity tax and the fuel tax levels 
(in rand per energy unit) is due to conversion 
losses when fuels are converted to electricity 
(Van Heerden et al., 2006).
Lastly, in scenario four, a tax is levied on 
intermediate and household consumption of 
energy – a combination of scenarios two and 
three. This tax is comparable to scenario one 
(except for the exclusion of the conversion 
losses from coal to petroleum products which 
account for approximately 10 per cent of the 
emissions), but is based on the consumption 
of energy and not the level of emissions itself. 
Also, coal consumption by poor households is 
excluded from taxation as this consumption 
is considered part of their basic needs. Poor 
households only pay the environmental tax 
on petroleum products and electricity (Van 
Heerden et al., 2006).
4.2 Tax instruments for reduced water 
 consumption
Figure 1 describes water requirements by sectors 
in South Africa. Irrigated agriculture is the 
largest consumer at 62 per cent; afforestation 
requires 3 per cent of the total water use; rural 
and urban populations 4 per cent and 23 per 
cent, respectively. Mining and bulk industrial, 
and power generation use 8 per cent on 
aggregate.
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Source: DWAF (2004)
Figure 1 
Water requirements by sectors in South Africa: 2000
The following scenarios were extracted from the 
suggestions proposed by water authorities and 
experts in South Africa:
(i) A surcharge of 10c per m3 water used by 
forestry.
(ii) A surcharge of 10c per m3 water used by 
irrigated agriculture.
(iii) A surcharge of 10c per m3 water used by all 
mining industries.
In South Africa, according to the National 
Water Act (Act No 36 of 1998), the government 
is regarded as the public trustee of the nation’s 
water resources. Under previous water 
legislation, pricing of water did not generally 
take into account the real cost of managing 
water, the cost of water supply and the scarcity 
value of water (MacKay, 2003: 64). Except 
for the fact that water is required to meet 
basic human needs and ecological reserve, the 
principle behind the current water pricing policy 
in South Africa is that payment for water should 
be at a level that reflects its scarcity. Currently 
25 litres of water per day per person is assumed 
to meet these needs. The pricing policy is 
structured into three tiers (CSIR, 2001):
• First tier: raw water tariffs administered by 
DWAF for the sale of water to water boards.
• Second tier: water boards set the wholesale 
price of water to bulk water users such as 
municipalities and industries such as Eskom 
and Sasol.
• Third tier: municipalities determine the price of 
water to charge end-users such as households 
and industries. 
A rise in raw water tariffs will automatically 
lead to an increase in the price in the second 
and third tiers. The South African government 
is introducing a water resource management 
charge to recover some of the costs for water 
management and to reflect water scarcity in 
the country. 
4.3 Recycling schemes
Three recycling or handback schemes are 
analysed: (i) a decrease in direct tax, (ii) a 
general decrease in indirect taxes, and (iii) 
a decrease in taxes on food. These recycling 
schemes are as politically sensitive as the 
environmental tax instruments discussed above, 
since business usually prefers a reduction of 
progressive direct taxes, while the labour unions 
prefer a reduction in regressive indirect taxes 
(Du Toit & Koekemoer, 2003: 49).
We implement the first recycling scenario via 
a uniform ordinary change in ad valorem rates of 
the direct tax on capital and labour. The second 
two scenarios are implemented via reductions 
in commodity taxes levied on purchases by 
households (VAT). In scenario two the tax 
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reduction lowers the prices of all consumer 
goods by an equal percentage. In scenario three 
only food becomes cheaper. All three scenarios 
would be simple to administer.
4.4 Target variables
Four target variables are calculated by the model 
to compare the different scenarios in terms of 
the three dividends: (i) environment via CO2 
emissions or water consumption, (ii) economy 
via GDP and employment, and (iii) equity via 
total consumption by the poor. Changes in 
each target variable are expressed per change 
of government revenue, so that different policy 
scenarios can easily be compared to each other 
on the basis of equal extra tax revenues.
These target variables have been chosen to see 
which energy tax or water charge and tax-recycling 
scenarios would best yield environmental, 
economic and equity dividends.
5 
The model and data
We use a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model for all our simulations. It is 
called “UPGEM”, and is based on the structure 
of the ORANI-G model (Horridge, 2002) 
written and solved using the GEMPACK 
suite of software (Harrison & Pearson, 1996). 
The model has a theoretical structure that is 
typical of a static CGE model, and consists of 
equations describing producers’ demands for 
produced inputs and primary factors; producers’ 
supplies of commodities; demands for inputs to 
capital formation; household demands; export 
demands; government demands; the relationship 
of basic values to production costs and to 
purchasers’ prices; market-clearing conditions for 
commodities and primary factors; and numerous 
macroeconomic variables and price indices.
Conventional neoclassical assumptions drive 
all private agents’ behaviour in the model. 
Producers minimise costs while consumers 
maximise utility, resulting in the demand and 
supply equations of the model. The agents are 
assumed to be price takers, with producers 
operating in competitive markets, which 
prevents the earning of pure profits.
In general, the static model with its overall 
Leontief production structure allows for limited 
substitution on the production side, but more 
substitution in consumption. It has CES sub-
structures for (i) the choice between labour, 
capital and land, (ii) the choice between the 
different labour types in the model, and (iii) the 
choice between imported and domestic inputs 
into the production process. In the short-run 
simulations reported here we do not allow for 
substitution in production between either energy 
or water and other inputs. Household demand 
is modelled as a linear expenditure system that 
differentiates between necessities and luxury 
goods, while households’ choices between 
imported and domestic goods are modelled 
using the CES structure.
The primary model database is the official 
1998 SAM of South Africa, published by 
Statistics South Africa (SSA, 2001). This SAM 
divides households into 48 groups (12 income 
by 4 ethnic), and distinguishes 27 sectors. For 
the purpose of this study, we split the energy- 
intensive as well as the agricultural sectors 
further to arrive at 39 sectors. 
The model’s closure rules reflect a short-run 
time horizon. The capital stock in each sector is 
assumed fixed, while the rate of return on capital 
is allowed to change. The South African labour 
market is characterised by large unemployment 
of unskilled labour, and a shortage of skilled 
labour. The model differentiates between 11 
different labour groups that are classified as 
either skilled or unskilled. Skilled labour is 
treated as human capital in inelastic short-term 
supply. The supply of unskilled labour is assumed 
to be perfectly elastic at fixed post-tax real wages 
(i.e. nominal post-tax wages deflated by the 
economy-wide CPI). The distinction between 
skilled and unskilled labour supply reflects the 
South African labour market realistically and 
allows for investigating the effect of certain 
policies on employment of unskilled labour. The 
supply of land is also assumed to be inelastic 
(Van Heerden et al., 2006).
It is assumed that aggregate investments, 
government consumption and inventories 
are exogenous and unaffected by the change 
in environmental taxes under consideration. 
Consumption spending by each of the 48 
544 SAJEMS NS 9 (2006) No 4
representative households follows labour 
income earned by each household, and the 
trade balance is endogenous. This specification 
allows us insight into the effect of the suggested 
policies on South Africa’s consumption and 
competitiveness. All technological change 
variables and all tax rates are exogenous to the 
model. Finally, the nominal exchange rate is the 
numeraire in each simulation. 
5.1 Energy data
To update and conform the greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions data to our SAM, a new 
emissions dataset was compiled (see Blignaut 
et al., 2005). The 1998 data from South Africa’s 
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) 
was used for these calculations. To calculate the 
energy balances, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) defaults were used 
for non-coal and non-CO2 GHG emissions, 
while CO2 factors specific to South Africa were 
used for coal. The calculated balances were 
used to then calculate the final CO2 and CO2 
equivalent (from methane, and nitrous oxide) 
figures as directed by the IPCC.
For each of the 39 activity sectors in the SAM, 
three matrices are appended in terms of (i) GHG 
emissions from burning of fuels, (ii) energy, 
including electricity consumed, (measured in 
TJ) and (iii) the same energy in (ii), including 
electricity, measured in native terms. From the 
calculations it was found that total emissions 
were estimated at 353Tg, a figure close to the 
344Tg reported by the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) for the same year. Using the SAM 
weights, the emissions were then shared between 
final demand and intermediate demand. South 
Africa extensively uses coal for energy and from 
the calculations of GHG emissions, 75 per cent 
of all emissions are generated by coal. 
5.2 Water data
South Africa is a semi-arid country. Precipitation 
has fluctuated over the years with an average of 
500 m3 per annum, well below the world average 
of about 860 mm per year (DWAF, 2004). 
The total flow of all the rivers in the country 
amounts to approximately 49,000 million m³ 
per year, less than half that of the Zambezi, 
the closest large river to South Africa. The 
National Water Resource Strategy estimates 
the total water requirement for the year 2000 at 
12,871 million m3 (at a 98 per cent assurance of 
supply), excluding environmental requirements, 
but including the basic human needs reserve 
(DWAF, 2004). 
The water supply and use accounts of the 
CSIR (2001) were used to calculate a vector of 
“taxable water” for each industry in the SAM, 
as well as a vector of “extra water charges” that 
may be charged on volumes of water used. The 
total water supply includes volumes of water 
from underground or rivers, or water returned 
from the formal water sectors. The water use by 
economic sectors was discussed in Section 4. 
6 
Results
6.1 Energy
An analysis of the results from the environmental 
taxes versus the recycling simulations shows 
that the experiments have largely opposing 
effects. While the energy tax tends to raise 
production costs thereby depressing sales and 
overall output, the recycling schemes reduce 
the production costs and thus boost sales. The 
environmental tax experiments lead to price 
increases through the cost effect, while recycling 
the revenue back reduces prices of commodities. 
Environmental taxes lead to a substitution to 
non-energy-rich activities away from the energy 
rich production, thus reducing emissions. On the 
other hand, with recycling schemes there is an 
indirect effect of increasing emissions through 
increased production. The results show that for 
all the four environmental taxes and the three 
recycling options, there is a fall in CO2 emissions. 
These emissions are recorded in CO2 Gg and are 
taken as emissions per million rand increase in 
total tax revenue. This reduction occurs because 
the fall in emissions due to the tax is larger in 
all experiments than the increase in emissions 
due to recycling.
To investigate whether a second dividend is 
found, the marginal excess burden (MEB) is 
calculated. This is calculated as a decrease in 
GDP divided by an increase in real government 
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income for the case of a decrease in GDP. For 
an increase in GDP due to the recycling options, 
MEB is the increase in GDP divided by the 
decrease in real total government income.
Table 2 shows that all environmental tax 
experiments reduce the MEB for GDP, while 
all recycling options increase GDP. The table 
gives the difference in MEBs between the 
environmental tax and recycling options. We 
see, for example, that a carbon tax together 
with a food tax break lead to a dividend because 
GDP increases. Thus, two recycling schemes, 
direct tax and indirect tax breaks, do not yield a 
second dividend. Only the food tax break gives 
the second dividend. 
Table 2 
Marginal excess burdens (MEB) of different tax instruments, for real GDP, and an indication of 
scenarios that result in a GDP dividend*
Recycling scheme
Direct tax break Indirect tax 
break
Food tax break
Environmental tax 0.101 0.132 0.156
Carbon tax 0.140 – – +
Fuel tax 0.148 – – +
Electricity tax 0.145 – – +
Energy tax 0.151 – – +
 * Numbers present the MEB for the environmental taxes and the recycling schemes, separately. They report 
the decrease in real GDP (rand) per increase in total tax revenue (rand), for the environmental tax, and 
increase in real GDP per decrease in total tax revenue, for the recycling scheme, respectively. Both series 
are without dimension. The central part of the table presents results for combined scenarios. The plus signs 
indicate that a budget neutral combination of the environmental tax and the recycling scheme yields a second 
dividend, i.e that the column MEB exceeds the row MEB.
Source: Van Heerden et al. (2006)
All experiments that lead to an increase in 
GDP also lead to an increase in unskilled 
employment, and vice versa, because of the close 
positive link between the two variables. Indeed, 
unskilled employment contributes about half of 
the GDP change. Using the change in unskilled 
employment per one billion rand change in 
real government income, the results show that 
in addition to the food tax break experiments, 
we also have a second dividend in some 
indirect tax break experiments. Employment 
is reduced the least by a carbon tax, then a fuel 
tax, then an energy tax and then an electricity 
tax. The reason for this order is that there 
is high complementarity between unskilled 
labour and electricity, while there is very little 
complementarity between unskilled employment 
and coal, the main source of carbon. This 
explains the difference in the results between 
the employment and GDP dividend.
The third dividend is a gain in consumption 
by poor households. Calculating the percentage 
change in real consumption of the poorest 
household per unit of real government income, 
it is realised that a triple dividend is obtained 
for all environmental taxes with a food tax 
break. This is because of the large share of 
food in the consumption basket of the poor. 
The fuel tax simulation is the best at reducing 
poverty, while the electricity tax simulation is 
the worst for poverty reduction, regardless of 
the recycling option. This is due to the relatively 
large expenditure allocated to electricity by the 
poor as opposed to the fuel tax.
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Table 3 
Marginal change in poverty (change in real consumption of poorest household groups per billion 
rand tax revenue), and an indication of scenarios that result in a poverty dividend
Recycling scheme
Direct tax break Indirect tax break Food tax break
Environmental tax  a=0.066
c=0.075
i=0.060
w=0.065
a=0.091
c=0.099
i=0.082
w=0.097
a=0.359
c=0.391
i=0.338
w=0.299
Carbon tax a=0.126 – – +
c=0.113 – – +
i=0.077 – + +
w=0.230 – – +
Fuel tax a=0.081 – + +
c=0.075 0 + +
i=0.069 – + +
w=0.083 – + +
Electricity tax a=0.165 – – +
c=0.122 – – +
i=0.080 – + +
w=0.266 – – +
Energy tax a=0.129 – – +
c=0.102 – – +
i=0.076 – + +
w=0.186 – – +
a = African, c = coloured, i = Indian, w = white
Source: Van Heerden et al. (2006)
6.2 Water
The first of the three dividends is the 
environmental dividend reaped which is derived 
by reduction in water use. Our results show that 
all the simulations do yield the first dividend, 
whether the revenue collected is recycled 
through a direct or indirect tax break. The water 
charge increases the price of water and directly 
affects the amount of water consumed, see table 
with elasticities in the Appendix. 
The model predicts that the water charge 
will lead to a decline in water consumption in 
the forestry and irrigated agricultural sector 
by 32 per cent and 6 per cent per billion rand 
tax revenue received, respectively. Water 
consumption by the mining sector would 
decrease by only 3 per cent per billion rand. The 
decrease in water consumption as a result of 
water charge is greater than an increase in water 
consumption because of tax breaks, thereby 
yielding the environmental dividend. 
The second dividend is the effect on the total 
economy, and is determined using the concept 
of marginal excess burden. The marginal excess 
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burden (MEB) is defined as the change in real 
GDP divided by the change in real government 
revenue. The MEBs for all eight water charge 
policy measures as well as the three recycling 
measures are given in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Marginal excess burdens of different tax instruments, and an indication of scenarios  
that result in a GDP dividend *
Recycling scheme
Direct tax 
break
Indirect tax 
break
Food tax break
Water tax 0.586 0.722 0.703
Tax on forestry water –0.825 – – –
Tax on mining water –0.547 + + +
 Gold mining –0.964 – – –
 Coal mining –0.658 – + +
 Other mining –0.249 + + +
Tax on irrigated agriculture –0.372 + + +
 Field crops –0.338 + + +
 Horticulture –0.442 + + +
 * The numbers represent the percent change in gross domestic product per 10 million rand tax revenue. In 
the column, a water tax is levied; the numbers are the reduction in GDP. In the row, the tax is recycled; the 
numbers are the increase in GDP. If the sum of the two effects is positive, GDP increases, and a “+” is given.
Source: Letsoalo et al. (2006)
A double dividend is indicated by a + sign in 
the table, that is, when the increase in real GDP 
per unit of real government revenue lost as a 
result of a tax break (recycling policy), is larger 
than the decrease in real GDP per unit of real 
government revenue collected from a new water 
charge. Only other mining, irrigated field crops 
and horticulture yield a double dividend. 
The percentage change in total employment 
per unit of real government revenue collected 
was also calculated, and the plusses and minuses 
follow exactly the same pattern as in Table 3 
above. That is, employment and GDP per unit 
of real government revenue are closely related 
to each other in the model. The explanation is 
simply that the total production function in the 
model has Leontief and CES characteristics in 
terms of intermediate and primary inputs, so 
that GDP and employment will always move in 
the same direction as a result of an exogenous 
shock.
The criterion used to measure an improvement 
in poverty levels is the percentage change in total 
real consumption of the three poorest household 
groups in the economy, by race. Some policy 
combinations render a net improvement for one 
race group, while they have detrimental effects 
on another. A tax on water consumption by 
mining industries other than gold and coal is the 
only water charge that could be recycled in a way 
that would benefit all four race groups within 
the poorest groups of households. However, 
all the water taxes except one would render the 
poverty dividend if they are combined with a tax 
break on food.
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Table 5 
Marginal change in poverty (%), and an indication of scenarios that result in a poverty dividend
Recycling scheme
Direct tax 
break
Indirect tax 
break
Food tax break
Water tax 0.104 0.133 0.403
Tax on forestry water –0.291 – – +
Tax on mining water –0.285 – – +
 Gold mining –0.568 – – –
 Coal mining –0.268 – – +
 Other mining –0.092 + + +
Tax on irrigated agriculture –0.196 – – +
 Field crops –0.175 – – +
 Horticulture –0.239 – – +
 a The numbers represent the percentage change in real consumption of the poorest household group per 
billion rand tax revenue. In the column, a water tax is levied; the numbers are the reduction in consumption. 
In the row, the tax is recycled; the numbers are the increase in consumption. If the sum of the two effects is 
positive, poverty decreases, and a “+” is given.
Source: Letsoalo et al. (2006)
For irrigated agriculture, it helps to differentiate 
between water charges on field crops and on 
horticultural crops. We found that a tax on 
irrigated horticultural crops has a more severe 
influence on the consumption of the poorest 
groups, in that at least one group is made worse 
off with this tax, while with irrigated field crops 
at most one group is made worse off.
7 
Conclusion and policy 
recommendations
The food tax break renders the best results 
of all the recycling schemes in both groups of 
simulations discussed above, namely it leads to 
triple dividends in the efforts to reduce carbon 
emissions as well as the efforts to reduce water 
consumption in South Africa. We would like to 
make the following policy recommendation for 
South Africa: A tax break on food financed by:
1. A carbon tax on all emissions from burning 
fossil-fuel at the point of combustion, 
applied to the CO2 emissions by sector.
2. A water charge on both irrigated field crops 
and some sectors of the mining industry.
Our results show that such a tax reform 
would increase the real income of the poorest 
households, increase economic growth, increase 
employment, reduce carbon dioxide emissions, 
and reduce water use.
Endnotes
1 There were, however, earlier authors who 
advanced these ideas. See Goulder (1994) for a 
more complete overview.
2 The literature distinguishes between a weak 
and a strong double dividend. In its weak form 
the theory requires revenue recycling to merely 
reduce the economic costs of the environmental 
tax compared to a situation where the revenues 
are returned as a lump sum. The literature 
widely supports this version of the theory. See 
for example Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994) for 
an analytical argumentation and Dellink (2003) 
for numerical results. A strong double dividend 
requires a revenue-neutral tax reform to produce 
both environmental and economic gains. The 
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discussion in the literature focuses on this more 
interesting version of the theory, as do we. 
3 In the theoretical tax literature, taxes on 
intermediate inputs generally have larger welfare 
costs than do equal-revenue taxes on primary 
factors or final goods for the same reason, i.e. they 
distort both the intermediate input choice and 
factor markets (Goulder, 1995: 288).
4 Another important addition to the analysis 
described above is the introduction of strategic 
behaviour on the labour market, e.g. leading to 
involuntary unemployment in the initial situation. 
Because our model does not incorporate strategic 
behaviour, this strand of literature is not described 
here. For more information see Bovenberg and 
Van der Ploeg (1998), Strand (1998), and Koskela, 
Schöb and Sinn (1998). 
5 For a given labour tax, the distortion in the labour-
leisure trade-off is greater as the (compensated) 
wage elasticity of labour supply increases. For a 
given capital income tax, and for a closed economy, 
the distortion along the intertemporal dimension 
– the margin of choice between consuming 
today and consuming in the future – is greater 
as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption increases. Thus, the relative marginal 
efficiency costs of labour and capital income taxes 
depend on these elasticities and on the magnitudes 
of labour and capital income tax rates. For an 
open economy, the distortion of a capital tax also 
depends on its base, either households’ capital 
income or firms’ profits, and on international 
capital mobility.
6 The MCPF (marginal cost of public funds) is equal 
to 1+ MEB.
7 The South African currency rand is abbreviated to 
‘R’.
8 It should be noted that the level of the carbon tax 
has little or no bearing on the results reported 
in Tables 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8, as we take ratios of tax 
effects divided by changes in tax revenues. If 
the model were linear, both the numerator and 
denominator would be proportional to the carbon 
tax level. Although the model is non-linear, the 
absolute size of the environmental taxes or tax 
handbacks only affects these ratios at the third 
decimal place. 
9 5 USD/tCO2 is close to the median of marginal 
climate change damages reported in the literature 
(Tol, 2005: Table 3).
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APPENDIX
Table A1 
Average water tariffs (2002) and the semi-elasticity for water demand
Industry
Water tariff 
(R/ m3)
% change 
due to an 
increase of 
R1
Elasticity
Semi 
elasticity
Taxable water 
(million m3)
Irrigated field 0.05 2000.0 –0.25 –500.0 7152.0
Dry field 0.05 2000.0 –0.15 –300.0 0
Irrigated horticulture 0.05 2000.0 –0.25 –500.0 3400.0
Dry horticulture 0.05 2000.0 –0.15 –300.0 0
Livestock 0.05 2000.0 –0.15 –300.0 191.1
Forestry 0.025 4000.0 –0.40 –1600.0 1673.0
Other Agric 0.05 2000.0 –0.15 –300.0 24.8
Coal 2.12 47.2 –0.32 –15.3 40.3
Gold 2.12 47.2 –0.32 –15.3 284.8
Crude, petroleum & gas 2.12 47.2 –0.48 –22.6 0.7
Other mining 2.12 47.2 –0.32 –15.3 368.3
Food 4.00 25.0 –0.39 –9.8 376.4
Textiles 4.00 25.0 –0.33 –8.3 104.4
Footwear 4.00 25.0 –0.33 –8.3 0
Chemicals & rubber 2.12 47.2 –0.15 –7.2 59.4
Petroleum refineries 2.12 47.2 –0.48 –22.6 92.0
Other non-metal minerals 2.79 35.8 –0.32 –11.6 44.0
Iron & steel 2.79 35.8 –0.27 –9.8 56.2
Non-ferrous metal 2.79 35.8 –0.27 –9.8 14.0
Other metal products 2.79 35.8 –0.27 –9.8 60.0
Other machinery 4.00 25.0 –0.25 –9.5 37.3
Electricity machinery 4.00 25.0 –0.38 –9.5 6.2
Radio 4.00 25.0 –0.38 –9.5 0
Transport equip 4.00 25.0 –0.38 –9.5 20.4
Wood, paper & pulp 2.12 47.2 –0.59 –27.8 157.5
Other manufacturing 4.00 25.0 –0.38 –9.5 13.0
Electricity 2.12 47.2 –0.80 –37.7 207.9
Water 2.12 47.2 –0.60 –28.3 5906.5
Construction 4.00 25.0 –0.38 –9.5 167.1
Trade 4.00 25.0 –0.19 –4.8 491.4
Hotels 6.11 16.4 –0.19 –3.1 319.8
Transport services 6.11 16.4 –0.19 –3.1 497.1
Community services 6.11 16.4 –0.19 –3.1 175.8
Financial institutions 6.11 16.4 –0.19 –3.1 281.3
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Real estate 6.11 16.4 –0.19 –3.1 662.0
Business activities 6.11 16.4 –0.19 –3.1 26.2
General government 6.11 16.4 –0.19 –3.1 524.8
Health services 6.11 16.4 –0.19 –3.1 331.3
Other service activities 6.11 16.4 –0.19 –3.1 198.7
Sources: Water tariff data: Own analysis based on various unpublished Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry, water board and municipal data.
Elasticities: DBSA (2000) Environmental impacts of the forestry sector in South Africa with specific reference to water 
resources. CSIR Report: ENV-P-C 99016.
 Renzetti, S. (1992) Estimating the structure of industrial water demands: The case of Canadian maufacturing, 
Land Economics, 68, no 4.
 Veck, G.A. and Bill, M.R. (2000) Estimation of the residential price elasticity of demand for water by means of a 
contingent valuation approach. Water Research Commission Report No: 790/1/00.
 Le Maitre, D.C., Versveld, D.B., Chapman, R.A. (2000) The impact of invading alien plants on surface water 
resources in South Africa: A preliminary assessment. WaterSA, 26(3): 397-408.
